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Abstract
Several studies indicate that humans are overconfident about their own (rela-
tive) abilities. We propose a notion of pragmatic beliefs, and show through an
example that this concept can shed light on why overconfidence emerges. Through
the example, we also shed light on the idea that that ’bounded rationality’ may
arise endogenously in a game - without assuming complexity costs.
1 Introduction
Several studies from psychology and experimental economics indicate that agents are
overconfident about their own (relative) abilities: For a variety of skills, agents seem
to believe they are more skillful than they really are.1 Although ’rational’ theories of
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1The classic example is car-driving, as in Svensson (1981). Most of the literature on overconfidence is
based on interview data. An exception is Camerer and Lovallo (1999), who reports on overconfidence in
entry decisions in games of skill (with monetary incentives). An interesting example of overconfidence in
market data appears in Asubel (1991), whose findings indicate that the credit card market is characterized
by users of credit cards being overconfident about their future ability to avoid overdrawn accounts. For
references to the psychologically minded literature on overconfidence, see Camerer and Lovallo.
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belief formation, like the Bayesian paradigm, can easily be made consistent with some
individuals in a population being overconfident, it is hard to make such theories consistent
with most, or a majority of, a population being overconfident, and across diﬀerent settings.
Hence rational theories of belief formation seem unfit to explain overconfidence.
The purpose of the present paper is to propose a notion of pragmatic beliefs, and
to suggest that this concept can shed light on why overconfidence can occur. In short,
we attempt to show with a simple game-theoretic example that if agents form beliefs
pragmatically, overconfidence can be the equilibrium outcome.
An agent that forms beliefs pragmatically forms beliefs that are (the most) useful to
him. The pragmatic explanation of beliefs should be contrasted with ’rational’ approaches
to beliefs, which focus on agents that try to reflect the ’world as it is’ in their beliefs (with
tools like Bayes’ law, the law of double expectation and so forth). As will become clear,
pragmatic beliefs need only have a weak relation to ’the world as it is’. We also contrast
the pragmatic explanation of beliefs to approaches assuming that beliefs are of intrinsic
value to agents, as with wishful thinking and with cognitive dissonance.
To show how the idea of pragmatic beliefs can shed light on overconfidence, we consider
a simple model of a job market. An agent is matched with a firm, and the firm makes a
take-it or leave it oﬀer. If the agent accepts the oﬀer, the game ends, while if the agent
rejects the oﬀer, he gets an outside opportunity. The take-it or leave-it oﬀer made by the
firm will in equilibrium depend partly on the worker’s productivity in the firm, and partly
on the agent’s beliefs about his outside opportunity, which is commonly known between
the firm and the worker. The key feature of this example is that instead of taking the
agent’s beliefs as a primitive, we let the agent’s beliefs about his outside opportunity
be an endogenous variable. We show that if agents form beliefs pragmatically, then in
equilibrium these beliefs will be inflated compared to the true distribution of the outside
opportunity, and interpret this as overconfidence.
A way to interpret the result is that overconfidence is a way for the agent to obtain a
first mover advantage towards the firm; overconfidence acts as if the first mover privilege
is shifted from the firm to the agent. Although this analogy is useful, we also consider
the case when both firms and workers form beliefs pragmatically, and show that the same
type of overconfidence results carry through to this case.
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An immediate criticism against the idea of pragmatic belief formation is that human
agents are incapable of constructing beliefs that they do not really believe in. We should
therefore stress from the outset that the main justification for pragmatic beliefs is dynamic;
pragmatic beliefs in a population are formed either by this selection pressure towards
agents that are born pragmatists, or by agents gradually learning that a certain way of
forming beliefs is more rewarding than other ways. Hence we make no assumptions on
the agents’ awareness about their own overconfidence. This, and other criticisms against
the notion of pragmatic beliefs will be discussed in a separate section.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the definition of ’over-
confidence’ and relate it to rationality. In section 3, we analyze the job market example,
and in Section 4 we provide a discussion of the approach to beliefs outlined in this paper.
Finally, in Section 5 we conclude.
1.1 Related Literature
The paper is related to several strands of the literature. In this section, we consider this
relation in some detail. The section can be skipped on first reading.
First, the paper is related to a new school of thinking on bounded rationality, exem-
plified by Rubinstein (1997), and surveyed by Lipman (1995). A central feature of this
school is that humans are information processors that are imperfect when compared to the
standard of the rationality paradigm. For example, Fershtman and Kalai (1994) consider
a setting where a manager has limited attention span, and the firm therefore concentrates
in only a few markets, and Rubinstein (1993) considers a setting where consumers have
heterogenous ability in understanding complex pricing schemes, and where the seller ex-
ploits this fact to profitably discriminate between consumers. Importantly, these models
derive the behavioral implications of certain cognitive imperfections, taking these imper-
fections as exogenous. In contrast, our approach illustrates how bounded rationality - in
the sense of imperfect information processing - can emerge endogenously from features of
the physical description of the game.
Second, there is a link to a philosophical school known as Pragmatism. According to
William James (1908), one of the founders of this school, ’beliefs are true to the extent
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that they breed true in their consequences’. One interpretation, as emphasized e.g., by
Russell (1945), is that agents should (or do) hold beliefs that have good consequences.
While ’good’ is a vague concept in most disciplines, economics seems particularly well-fit
to include a notion of Pragmatism, since we can understand ’good’ just as ’high utility’
or ’high fitness’.2 Therefore, the present paper may be seen as a modest attempt to link
Pragmatism and Economics.
Third, since pragmatic beliefs are determined by what is useful, or beneficial, for the
agent (rather than what is ’true’), the pragmatic approach to belief formation relates
to models of cognitive dissonance. While an universally accepted definition of ’cognitive
dissonance’ does not exist, the notion of cognitive dissonance discussed by economists
concerns agents whose utility depends directly on their beliefs (see e.g., Akerlof and Dick-
ens, 1982, Rabin, 1994). Therefore, the agent may form beliefs that are at striking odds
with ’reality’ because he feels better that way. For example, an agent that cannot accept
his limitations and convinces himself that he is other than he is to comfort himself, suﬀers
from cognitive dissonance. In contrast, the link between beliefs and utility we explore is
indirect ; beliefs of an agent aﬀect his utility only through aﬀecting the actions of other
agents. Specifically, we assume that agents are indiﬀerent per se to which beliefs they
hold.
Fourth, many authors acknowledge that material payoﬀs in games can be higher for
agents that are less than fully rational than for fully rational agents (e.g., Gilboa and
Samet, 1989), or might be less than fully rational (Kreps et al., 1986).3 More closely
related to our approach, Frank (1988), building on Schelling (1978), argues that emotions
2A standard line of argument against the Pragmatist position is that ’good’ can be understood to
mean ’true predictions’, so that the Pragmatist position is impeccable, but vacuous (see e.g., Scruton,
1994).
3Let us briefly discuss these two approaches. Gilboa and Samet argue that agents able to handicap
themselves through committing to use a simple strategy may ’blackmail’ more rational players, and obtain
a higher payoﬀ. This approach is diﬀerent to ours since the most plausible interpretation of their self-
handicapping is (arguably) that of physically ’burning bridges’, which has little to do with cognition or
belief formation. The reputation model of Kreps et al. (1986), on the other hand, does not provide a
story for how the ’irrational’ agents come into the picture in the first place. In contrast, we argue that a
simple learning mechanism can produce pragmatic agents.
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may serve as a commitment device to e.g., enforce agreements that otherwise would suﬀer
from asset-specificity problems. However, the role of cognitive capacity as a commitment
device, and its relation to overconfidence, is not considered by Frank; in particular Frank
assumes that strategic motives merely aﬀects emotions; the rationality assumptions he
makes are standard.
Fifth, there is a growing related literature that attempts to endogenize preferences
through the theory of natural selection (e.g., Rogers, 1994, Robson, 1996). However, in
contrast to the present approach the rationality assumptions made in this literature are
standard; evolution is only allowed to work on preferences. In conclusion, while there
are several attempts in the literature to endogenize emotional capacity and preferences
through incentives (fitness), the literature has not considered the possibility that beliefs,
or cognition more generally, could be explained by incentives.4
2 Overconfidence
In this section, we define and discuss some basic terms. Suppose for simplicity that ability,
a, is a one-dimensional magnitude, that in principle can take any value between 0 and
1.5 Furthermore, suppose that the agent has a probability distribution over this interval,
interpreted as the agent’s subjective beliefs about his abilities. For simplicity, assume that
this distribution can be represented by a (diﬀerentiable) cumulative distribution, F (..),
with F (0) = 0, F (1) = 1, and density f(..). Hence, from the viewpoint of the agent, his
ability is a random variable, denoted by x. We define the agent’s confidence level, c, as
4The only exception we are aware of is Robson (1999). However, while our starting point is to ex-
plain why human cognition falls short of the rationality ideal, Robson has the opposite starting point,
namely to explain why humans are endowed with such a highly developed intelligence (compared to other
species). Specifically, Robson models the ’Red Queen eﬀect’, that human intelligence can be explained
by intra-species competition (i.e., competition between human genes), rather than inter-species competi-
tion. Since Robson’s type of evolution best can be understood as working in the extreme long run, while
our ’evolution’ to pragmatic beliefs primarily should be understood as a learning phenomenon, the two
approaches talk about diﬀerent things rather than being inconsistent.
5It is assumed that the ability a has no direct relation to how the agents form beliefs about a. Hvide
(1999b) considers the case when there is a circularity problem.
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the mean of the distribution,




We say that an agent is overconfident if,
c > a (2)
and that the agent is underconfident if,
c < a (3)
Hence the agent is overconfident if his confidence level exceeds his true ability, and un-
derconfident if his confidence level is lower than his true ability.6
Notice first that overconfidence at individual level is perfectly consistent with un-
bounded rationality; an overconfident person could be someone that coincidentally has
received a string of positive signals about his abilities, and hence has obtained a too high
opinion about herself at ’misfortune’.7
Second, in the tradition of Kahneman and Tversky, experimental psychologists have
for long been interested in ’overconfidence’. Somewhat confusingly, this literature applies
two distinct meanings of the term ’overconfidence’, and more or less interchangeably.
Let us elaborate on that point since it is important to the originality of the project of
the present paper. First, overconfidence1, defined above, relates to ’hubris’, or agents
that conceive themselves as more able than they really are. Second, overconfidence2, in
6Two comments to the definition. First, one alternative would be to define overconfidence as a
confidence level that exceeds the level obtained with a rational interpretation of available data. In that
case, overconfidence would imply bounded rationality, in contrast to under the proposed definition. The
alternative definition would work equally well to the proposed definition in the example in the next
section. However, the proposed definition seems to be less ambiguous than the alternative definition
since the meaning of ’available data’ is not always clear. Second, if one were to introduce a measure of
overconfidence, higher moments of the belief distribution of the agent could also matter. For example,
an agent that is certain that his ability is b (where b > a) may be viewed as more overconfident than an
agent that also has b as his mean ability level, but with a non-degenerate belief distribution.
7Therefore, one may sometimes wish to define overconfidence as something that can occur on popula-
tion level rather than at individual level, where the idea is that coincidences wash out at aggregate level
(see Hvide 1999c, Lemma 1, for a result along these lines).
6
contrast, relates to agents that are ’too certain’ about some event, through having a ’too
tight’ distribution of posteriors. For example, an agent is overconfident2 if he believes that
the stock price of share y tomorrow will be between $15 and $17 with 90% probability,
while in reality the 90% confidence interval should be set between $14 and $18.
Since several papers in the finance literature explore the notion of overconfidence2
(e.g., De Long et al. 1990, Kyle and Wang, 1996, and Daniel et al., 1998), it is natural to
ask whether there is any logical relation between overconfidence1 and overconfidence2. Is
there any? We think clearly not. For example, a stock analyst that has a too high opinion
about his predictive abilities may believe that the volatility of a stock is higher than it
really is, and set his confidence interval broader than a more experienced analyst. Hence
the analyst is overconfident1 and underconfident2. Of course, it is also possible that the
overconfident1 analyst sets the confidence interval narrower than it should be, in which
case he would be both overconfident1 and overconfident2. The point is that there is no clear
relation between overconfidence1 and overconfidence2; they reflect diﬀerent underlying
phenomena.8 In the extension of this point, let us make two comments. First, the
finance literature assumes a clear relation between overconfidence1 and overconfidence2.
For example, Daniel et al. (1998) states that, ’Our theory assumes that investors view
themselves as more able to value securities than they actually are [overconfidence1], so
that they underestimate their forecast error variance [overconfidence2] (p. 6). This is not
a valid inference. Furthermore, from this type of statement, one could easily be tempted
to conclude - invalidly - that the project of the present paper to a large part already has
been undertaken in the finance literature.9 Second, notice that since overconfidence2 may
simply be due to a too tight prior distribution, and hence consistent with the Bayesian
8In the stock market example, overconfidence1 relates to a skewed first moment of a (subjective)
probability distribution over one’s own abilities, while overconfidence2 relates to a skewed second moment
of a (subjective) probability distribution over one’s own forecast for some external event. Instead of
predicting some external event, we could imagine that the agent were making overconfident2 predictions
about his own abilities. Neither in that case would there be any logical relation between overconfidence1
and overconfidence2.
9See De Long et al. (1990) and Kyle and Wang (1996) for papers showing that overconfident2 agents
can obtain a higher payoﬀ than agents who are not.
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paradigm,10 while overconfidence1 is hard to explain without appealing to some form of
bounded rationality.
3 Pragmatic Beliefs
We define the pragmatic beliefs of an agent in a given situation as those beliefs that
maximizes utility, or material payoﬀ for that agent. In the present section we construct
a job market example that shows how the notion of pragmatic beliefs can be useful
in understanding overconfidence. The example will surpress how pragmatic beliefs are
actually formed, and how agents that form beliefs pragmatically can be distinguished
from agents that form beliefs rationally. These and other interpretational issues will be
discussed in the next section.
There is one risk-neutral worker and a continuum of risk-neutral firms. At time 1, the
worker is matched with a firm. The worker’s productivity true productivity in that firm,
denoted by z, depends on the match. Ex-ante, the distribution of productivities is given
by G(z), with density g(z), where z ∈ [0, 1]. Then the time 1 firm makes a take-it or
leave-it wage oﬀer w1 to the worker. If the worker accepts the oﬀer, the game ends. If the
worker rejects the oﬀer, he moves on to time 2. At time 2, the worker is matched with a
new firm, and receives an oﬀer w2. We assume that wages at time 2 are set competitively,
such that the wage oﬀers at time 2 follows the distribution G(..).11 Then the game ends
(there is no recall of the time 1 oﬀer). The decision of the time 1 firm which wage to oﬀer
the agent, and the decision of the worker is whether to accept the oﬀer or not. Hence
the agent faces a two-stage search problem, where the oﬀer at time 1 is endogenous. For
simplicity we assume that there is no discounting or search costs; hence the utility U
of a worker simply equals his wage. Nothing essential in the example hinges on these
assumptions.
The informational assumption we make is that the time 1 firm knows the worker’s
productivity in that firm, and moreover it knows G(w2). The worker, on the other hand,
10See Morris (1995).
11For example, the agent is matched with two randomly drawn identical firms at time 2. As will become
clear, nothing hinges on this assumption.
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has merely formed beliefs about G(w2), where these beliefs are denoted by H(w2). H(w2)
has the same support as G(w2). Hence H(w2) reflects both the agent’s beliefs about his
productivity in the time 1 firm, and his beliefs about the distribution of wage oﬀers at time
2. Notice that since the randomness inherit in G(w2) can be attributed to randomness in
the matching technology, we can interpret the mean of G(w2), labeled w¯2, as the worker’s
true (average) ability. Let w˙2 be the worker’s expectation of w2, given his subjective








Remark 1 If the agent is overconfident then w˙2 > w¯2, and if the agent is underconfident
then w˙2 < w¯2.
Hence if the worker is overconfident, his confidence level exceeds his true (average)
ability, and if the worker is underconfident, his confidence level is lower than his true
(average) ability. If w˙2 = w¯2, say that the agent has a neutral confidence level.
Start out with the case with neutral confidence, i.e., when w˙2 = w¯2. Then, clearly,
the worker’s optimal strategy is to accept any oﬀer above w¯2 at time 1.12 The optimal
strategy for the time 1 firm is to set,
w1 = w¯2 if z > w¯2 (4)
w1 < w¯2 if z < w¯2
If the worker’s productivity is suﬃciently high, the firm oﬀers the agent a wage equal
to the agent’s reservation wage. If not, the firm oﬀers the worker a low wage (which is
equivalent to the firm making no oﬀer at all). Hence when the worker and the firm share
the true beliefs about the probability distribution over wage oﬀers at time 2, the expected
utility of the worker is w¯2. Clearly the time 1 firm runs an expected surplus, since it will
only hire the worker if the worker’s productivity exceeds his wage.
Now consider the case when the worker’s confidence level may diﬀer from his true
ability, i.e., when w˙2 6= w¯2. How does the firm’s optimal strategy change compared to the
12The agent may update his beliefs over time 2 oﬀers when receiving the time 1 oﬀer, but for simplicity
we ignore this possibility.
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benchmark (4)? Since the worker will not accept any oﬀer below his confidence level w˙2,
we get that the optimal strategy for the firm is in this case to set,
w1 = w˙2 if z ≥ w˙2 (5)
w1 < w˙2 if z < w˙2
We ask whether an agent with pragmatic beliefs will be under- or overconfident about
his abilities, and hence about what he can get at time 2. First a formal definition of
pragmatic beliefs.
Definition 3.1 The pragmatic belief, w˙2∗, is the w˙2 that maximizes the agent’s utility.
Notice that from (5) we know that every w˙2 induces a unique equilibrium oﬀer from
the time 1 firm (and a unique acceptance strategy for the worker). Hence we can write the
worker’s utility on reduced form as a function of w˙2 and of w¯2 only, i.e., U = U (w˙2, w¯2).
Since w¯2 is a constant, w˙2∗ is well-defined.13 We get the following result.
Proposition 1 The pragmatic beliefs are overconfident.





U(w˙2, w¯2) = argmax
w˙2
{P (w˙2)w˙2 + (1− P (w˙2))w¯2) (6)
Hence the pragmatic belief finds the optimal trade-oﬀ between getting a high wage oﬀer
at time 1, and the probability of getting an oﬀer at time 1 at all. Given the firm’s optimal





13Two comments to the definition of pragmatic beliefs. First, alternatively we could define pragmatic
beliefs through H(..) rather than through w˙2. In that case, all we would require is that the mean of H(..)
equals w˙2. Second, in games with multiple equilibria for at least some w˙2, we need to select between





= −g(w˙2), the first order condition becomes,
g(w˙2)[w¯2 − w˙2] + P (w˙2) = 0 (8)
Since P (..) > 0, we have that w˙∗2 > w¯2, and hence the pragmatic belief is overconfident.
Proposition 1 shows that a high belief about one’s market value can to some extent
be self-fulfilling, in that high expectations about future job oﬀers forces the time 1 firm
to give a higher oﬀer to attract the worker than when the agent has lower expectations
about his future.
Notice three features of the solution. First, the overconfident solution induces an
ineﬃcient allocation of workers: Since it is socially optimal that the worker starts working
in any time 1 firm where his marginal productivity is at least w¯2, it is socially optimal
that the worker has a neutral confidence level. Second, since w˙∗2 is below 1, there is a
bound to the optimal degree of overconfidence. A worker that excessively overconfident
will practically always reject the oﬀer at time 1, and hence in expected terms get a payoﬀ
close to w¯2. Still, a small degree of overconfidence is better than no overconfidence at all
(or even worse, underconfidence, in which case he would accept oﬀers below w¯2), since his
expected payoﬀ is larger than w¯2 even for w˙2 very close to 1. We illustrate this point in
a figure, calculated for g(z) = 1 (which gives w¯2 = 12).
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The figure depicts the expected utility of the worker as a function of his degree of
confidence.14 While underconfidence is severely punished in that the worker accepts a
too low oﬀer at time 1, a moderate degree of overconfidence (w˙2 = 34) gives the agent the
highest expected utility. When the agent becomes excessively overconfident (w˙2 → 1),
the expected utility converges from above to the expected utility under neutral confidence
(w˙2 = 12).
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The third thing to notice is that there is an alternative way to derive w˙∗2. Suppose
that the worker (instead of the firm) makes the take-it or leave-it oﬀer at time 1, and
denote this oﬀer by w˜. Conditional on the oﬀer, the optimal strategy for the firm is then
14Surpressing w¯2, the reduced form utility is given by U(w˙) = −w˙2 + 32 w˙.
15If there are several stages in the search process, instead of only two, excessive overconfidence (w˙ close
to 1) would lead to excessively long search, but it would still hold that excessive underconfidence (w˙ close
to 0) is worse than excessive overconfidence.
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to,
accept the oﬀer if z ≥ w˜ (9)
reject the oﬀer if z < w˜
In setting the optimal take-it or leave-it oﬀer, the agent then trades-oﬀ the probability
of getting the oﬀer accepted with the size of the oﬀer. Denote the probability of having




{Q(w˜)w˜ + (1−Q(w˜))w¯2) (10)
The first order condition becomes,
∂Q(w˜)
∂w˜
[w¯2 − w˜] +Q(w˜) = 0 (11)
but given the firm’s optimal strategy, Q(w˜) =
R 1
w˜
g(z)dz = P (w˜), and hence w˜∗ = w˙∗2.
Consequently, the solution to the optimal belief problem is equivalent to the solution to
the optimal take-it or leave-it oﬀer, in terms of utility to the worker and profits to the
firm. Hence we can interpret the possibility of overconfidence as a way of taking the first
mover advantage from the firm to the worker.
Given the equivalence, a natural question is then whether the whole advantage of over-
confidence boils down to a question about first mover advantage. To illustrate that more
than that is at issue, in the Appendix we consider a twist to the story, where both parties
at time 1 can form pragmatic beliefs. The conclusion here is that the overconfidence result
survives also when both parties form beliefs pragmatically.
4 Discussion
In the example constructed in Section 2, overconfident beliefs (that are known to the firm)
forces the firm to oﬀer a higher wage than it would to an otherwise identical agent, except
with a more neutral self-confidence. Hence overconfidence can be beneficial for an agent.
It follows that agents with pragmatic beliefs obtain a higher payoﬀ than those without
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this faculty. In the present section we discuss whether we can expect pragmatic beliefs to
be formed, and how beliefs possibly can be observable to firms.
There are two dynamic ways to justify a notion of pragmatic beliefs, either through
long term evolution of cognition, in the spirit of modern evolutionary theory, or through
learning. First, is perfectly possible to set up an evolutionary model where there is a
selection pressure towards agents that are born pragmatists, in the sense that they are
borne with a too high opinion about themselves, and are hardwired to retain this property
of their belief structure as they grow up. However, since evolution by nature is backward-
looking, it is not clear how adaption to social condition in the hunterer-gatherer society
can make humans optimally equipped in a modern labor market. Therefore, although the
evolutionary defense of pragmatic beliefs could be worth pursuing further, let us turn to
the more easily argued for learning defense.
The learning defense of pragmatic beliefs takes as starting point that humans rather
than being genetically equipped with overconfidence, gradually converges to pragmatic be-
lief formation through a process of metalearning. The basic force behind this convergence
is the law of reinforcement: agents converge to pragmatic information processing, i.e.,
any updating rule leading to pragmatic beliefs, because pragmatic information processing
pays better oﬀ than other ways of processing information.
To make such metalearning plausible, we need the agent to repeatedly face the same
type of problem, and for him to have a reasonable possibility to experiment with diﬀerent
ways of processing information.16 The job market example is useful in pointing to such a
context; every time a new contract is oﬀered (or potentially is oﬀered), the worker must
weigh up the oﬀer against how much he believes he is worth in the outside market. More-
over, the job market environment is suﬃciently diﬀuse to make straightforward Bayesian
learning improbable.
The crucial hypothesis in the argument chain leading to pragmatic beliefs is that in
16Notice that Bayesian learning presumes that the learning environment is specified to an extent that
makes other types of learning appear illogical, or even inconsistent. In reality, information processing
depends on subjective interpretation (e.g., how informative is the signal s about a?- a question that the
agent is precluded from asking in the Bayesian model of belief updating), and where diﬀerent ways of
interpreting data can be subject to experimentation.
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assessing the relative merit of diﬀerent ways of processing information, the agent takes
into account what pays rather than what is true.17 For example, instead of minutiously
balancing his job failures against the successes when assessing his ability, the agent (un-
consciously) forgets the failures and remembers the successes. Or, more generally, agents
learn that placing more emphasis on certain type of information about their abilities
(’good news’) than on a diﬀerent type of information (’bad news’) make them better oﬀ
at the end of the day. The agent does not have to see the causal link himself, and -
unless it should be profitable - the agents pay little attention to whether their confidence
level is realistic or not. To conclude, we envisage a learning process underlying prag-
matic beliefs similar in spirit to standard reinforcement learning; just as such learning
implies that agents tend to drift towards better actions, pragmatic agents drift towards
ways of processing information that is better for themselves, and hence towards pragmatic
beliefs.18
Independently of how the pragmatic beliefs are reached, one may argue that beliefs
cannot have a commitment eﬀect on the behavior of other agents, or any other eﬀect,
because an agent’s beliefs are not observable to other agents. In particular, how can over-
confidence be distinguished from strategic bluﬃng - when a person knows his limitations
well but have a talent for presenting themselves in a more favorable way than his abilities
would warrant? We have two replies to this. First, beliefs, particularly self-beliefs, may
indeed be observable to some extent. As described in detail by Frank (1988), there are
many cues to detecting lies. One is to focus on the expressions that are least subject to
conscious control, for example blushing or an elevated pitch of the voice. Of course, no
cues are perfect, but the existence of them can induce a substantial cost of lying.19 Notice
17The agent may define truth as what pays, in which case there would be no diﬀerence between a true
position and a position that pays. Notice, however, that it is not clear why pragmatic agents should be
interested in the concept of ’truth’ at all. Unless it pays.
18This could imply that job market confidence level could be diﬀerent from, say, confidence level at
home. This seemingly implies that the belief system of the agent is inconsistent. However, although
inconsistent through time, the belief system could be consistent at every point in time (which is probably
what should be required), with the agent ’forgetting’ his previous beliefs when entering a new situation,
and then remember them again when entering the old situation again (for a paper that discusses logical
properties of dynamic beliefs systems with forgetting, see Hvide, 1999a).
19As long as such cues are informative at all, with risk neutral agents it is simple to construct suitable
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also that the cost of lying will be aggravated by a diﬀerent incentive principle; since firms
will make a higher profit on workers that have a correct level of confidence than on over-
confident workers, firms will have an incentive to attempt to distinguish overconfidence
from strategic bluﬃng.
Second, a more traditional explanation for how firms can infer the true beliefs of
the workers is that workers undertake certain actions to credibly signal their confidence
level. For example, schooling may have the property that an agent’s expected cost of
schooling is negatively correlated with his confidence level. In that case, there can exist
a separating equilibrium where those with high confidence level undertake schooling, and
those with low confidence level skip school.20 In such a separating equilibrium, those
who are truly overconfident can be distinguished from those that merely pretend to be
overconfident.21 To conclude, it is not necessarily true that true and fake overconfidence
cannot be distinguished.
5 Conclusion
Which factors shape the manner in which agents create and update their beliefs about
economic variables? The traditional answer to this question, imported from statistical
theory, is that economic agents pursue some notion of ’truth’ in their belief formation.
This idea is clearly formulated in e.g., textbook game-theoretic approaches. The basic
idea in the present paper is that the main force behind belief formation is incentives, and
not any abstract notion of ’truth’. From this idea, we proposed the notion of pragmatic
beliefs, where such beliefs are simply those that maximize the payoﬀ in a given situation.
forcing schemes, such that only those who are truly overconfident will claim to have a (too) high confidence
level.
20This is true e.g., in the signaling model of Weiss (1983).
21In such a separating equilibrium, overconfident agents may or may not receive a higher net material
payoﬀ than agents with neutral confidence (when the true cost of schooling is subtracted). Under risk
neutrality, overconfident agents will be worse oﬀ than agents with neutral confidence. The intuition is
that agents with neutral confidence can always imitate the overconfident agents, if the latter should get a
higher payoﬀ. Under risk aversion, however, this result does not necessarily hold true; under risk aversion
overconfident agents may get a higher average material payoﬀ than agents with neutral confidence, and
hence be more fit. For a related point, see Waldman (1994).
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To indicate that the notion of pragmatic beliefs can be useful, we considered the over-
confidence puzzle established in experimental studies. This puzzle, that real life agents
seems to be overconfident about their own abilities, can hardly be explained by any tradi-
tional, rational, notion of belief formation. Equipped with the notion of pragmatic beliefs,
however, we showed that overconfidence can emerge as an equilibrium phenomenon, in
that the pragmatic beliefs in a simple job market example were shown to be overconfident.
The example showed that overconfidence can be beneficial to an agent, due to strategic
eﬀects. However, it was silent on how agents emerge at overconfidence, and how firms can
distinguish true from fake overconfidence. In Section 4, these questions were discussed. To
model in a more general setting how pragmatic beliefs are formed and observed suggests an
extension of the present work. Moreover, it could be interesting to see whether laboratory
experiments could verify the hypothesis that agents in repeated settings tend to converge
to pragmatic beliefs rather than to true beliefs about e.g., their own abilities.
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7 Appendix
Here, we consider the case when the time 1 firm also can construct a pragmatic belief.
The purpose with this section is to show that the overconfidence result of Proposition 1
survives letting the firm as well as the agent form pragmatic beliefs.
We consider a situation where the worker forms a pragmatic belief about this distri-
bution of wage oﬀers at time 2, while the firm constructs a pragmatic belief about the
agent’s productivity in its own firm. We retain the assumption that both the firm and
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the worker are risk-neutral. For simplicity it is assumed that also the agent knows his
true productivity at time 1.22 The timing of the game is now that the beliefs are first set
simultaneously, then the model proceeds as before.
Notice that when both sides construct pragmatic beliefs, the pragmatic belief of the
agent depends on the pragmatic belief formed by the firm, and vice versa. Denote the
firm’s belief about the worker byMP , and the agent’s belief by w˙2, as before. Say that
the firm is overconfident (underconfident) about the ability of the worker if MP > z
(< z).23 Let us start out with the optimal bid by the firm. For a givenMP and w˙2 we
get the firm’s optimal oﬀer is,
w1 = w˙2 ifMP > w˙2 (12)
w1 < w˙2 ifMP < w˙2
As before, the optimal strategy of the worker is to accept the oﬀer if w1 = w˙2 and to
reject the oﬀer if w1 < w˙2. Given the equilibrium of the oﬀer subgame, we solve for the
equilibrium in pragmatic beliefs. We then have,
Proposition 2 If z < w¯2, both the firm and the worker have neutral confidence in equi-
librium. However, if z > w¯2, the worker is overconfident in all Nash equilibria, the firm
is underconfident, and the worker’s utility is higher than under neutral confidence.
Proof. For a given (w¯2, z) there are many Nash equilibria. We proceed to show that
all these Nash equilibria involves the firm being underconfident about the ability of the
worker, and the worker being overconfident. First we derive the agent’s best response
in terms of w˙2, as a function of MP. First suppose that MP < w¯2. In that case any
22This assumption makes things simpler, but qualitatively the same conclusion holds for the game
where the agent forms his pragmatic belief based on a probability distribution of productivities at time
1.
23Notice that we allow for the firm to have a diﬀerent belief about the agent’s productivity than z,
even if it is informed of z. This is a clearly somewhat contrived assumption. To make the example more
realistic, we could model the firm as having slightly noisy information about z, and form (pragmatic)
beliefs based on this information. However, since this more realistic version of the example is also more
notationally demanding, without really adding anything, we keep the assumption that the firm may
believe something diﬀerent from what it is informed of.
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w˙2 >MP is strictly better than w˙2 <MP , since w˙2 <MP implies that the firm will set
w1 = w˙2, and the worker will accept the oﬀer in spite of w¯2 > w˙2. Hence any w˙2 >MP is
a best reply whenMP < w¯2. Now suppose thatMP > w¯2. In that case, the unique best
reply will be to set w˙2 =MP , since that will ensure the highest possible oﬀer at time 1,
and furthermore this oﬀer will exceed w¯2. Now to the best response of the firm in terms
ofMP , as a function of w˙2. For any w˙2 > z, it is clearly suboptimal for the firm to set
MP > w˙2, since the firm will then run a deficit when in the next turn oﬀering w1 = w˙2.
It follows that anyMP < w˙2 is a best response of the firm in the case where w˙2 > z. Now
to the case w˙2 < z. In that case it is a unique best response for the firm to setMP = w˙2.
It follows that for z > w¯2, the set of Nash equilibria are the points on the 45 degree line
between (w¯2,w¯2) and (z,z), which are all characterized by the agent being overconfident
about the distribution of wage oﬀers at time 2, and the firm being underconfident about
the worker’s productivity. On the other hand, for z < w¯2, the unique Nash equilibrium
is the point (w¯2, z). Hence with probability 1/2 the equilibrium is one where the agent
is overconfident and gets a higher utility than the case of correct confidence, and with
probability 1/2 the equilibrium is one with correct degree of confidence.
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